REVIEW ESSAY

Totemism Transcended?: The Ambivalent Aspirations
of Richard Posner's Jurisprudence
A. POSNER,t OVERCOMING LAW, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1995) (597 pages) ($39.95)

RICHARD

Norman W Spaulding III*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The "law" to which my title refers is a professional totem signifying all that is pretentious, uninformed, and spurious in the legal
tradition. A pragmatic approach can help demolish the totem.
Economic analysis can help put better things in its place.
-Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law1
It was in fact the ancient totem animal, the primitive god himself, by the killing and consuming of which the clansmen renewed and assured their likeness to the god.
-Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo2
If there is a modern legal expression of totemic religion, its
origin must be sought in a political analogy to the primal patriarchal horde, dominated, as Freud suggests, by "a violent and jealous
father who keeps all the females for himself and drives away his
sons as they grow up."' Substituting political sovereignty for females as the object of male desire, the monopoly on powerjustified
by divine right in monarchies would seem to be the appropriate
analog.4 The distinction between subject and sovereign parallels
the prohibition on incest, assuring the patriarchal figure exclusive
rights to both the power of pleasure and the pleasure of power.
In the overthrow of monarchy, the murder of the king, democracy emerges as a compromise between anarchy (constant war
among the brothers of the horde) and tyranny (a retrenchment of
the patriarchy/parricide logic that would result should any one
t Chief Judge, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
* Candidate for J.D., 1997, Stanford Law School, B.A. 1993, Williams College. I
am especially grateful to Professors Thomas Grey, Margaret Jane Radin, and Janet
Halley for thoughtful criticism and generous support.
1 Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 21 (1995).
2 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo 171 (James Strachey trans., 1950).
3 Id. at 175.
4 Id. at 186.
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brother be deemed king). What keeps the peace, in Freud's analysis, is totemic worship, a faith requiring the observance of two primary taboos that mirror the original commands of the primal
father: one prohibits the killing of totem animals, the other prohibits sex between members of the same totem clan. Ironically
then, the price of collective liberation from the domination of the
primal father is continuing submission to his prohibitions:
The most primitive kind of organization that we actually come
across - and one that is in force to this day in certain tribes consists of bands of males; these bands are composed of members with equal rights and are subject to the restrictions of the
totemic system .... One day the brothers who had been driven
out came together, killed and devoured their father and so
made an end of the patriarchal horde .... The dead father became
stronger than the living one had been ... What had up to then
been prevented by his actual existence was thenceforth prohibited by the sons themselves in accordance with the psychological
procedure so familiar to us in psycho-analysis under the name of
'deferred obedience.' They revoked their deed by forbidding
the killing of the totem, the substitute for their father; and they
renounced its fruits by resigning their claim to the women who
had now been set free.3
In a democracy, rule of law principles serve the purposes of the
totem, separating the creation of legal rules in the political process
from the application of those rules in the judicial process, making
taboo the intermingling of law and politics. So long as the objectivity, neutrality, and autonomy of legal reasoning is maintained, and
so long as law remains separate from politics, submission to the
rules generated in the political process can be accepted as democratic in purpose and effect rather than tyrannical. Thus, just as in
fraternal clans - where totemic powers are attributed to animals
which then become the object of worship - in the legal theories of
modern democracies we attribute totemic powers to and worship
rule of law principles that protect the boundary between legal and
political decision-making. Violation of the incest taboo (admitting,
for instance, that mechanical rules cannot constrain judges'
human biases, or conceding more generally that law is inherently if
not completely subjective, partial, and interdependent) is an attack
on the totem principles, the rule of law itself, and the transgressor
becomes taboo. As Freud summarizes, "The violation of a taboo
makes the offender himself taboo .... [A]nyone who has transgressed one of these prohibitions himself acquires the characteris5 Id. at 175-78 (emphasis added).
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tic of being prohibited .... "6
In exploring the "riddle of taboo"7 Freud also noted an ambivalence in the worship of totemic figures which repeats the feelings
of ambivalence vis-a-vis the father. On the one hand, there is reverence for the totem born of remorse for the murder of the father;
on the other hand there is hatred of the totem born of rebellious
lust for its power. Freud suggests that in fraternal clans the periodic sacrifice of the totem animal - violation of the taboo on its
harm or consumption - permits expression of this ambivalence.
In such ceremonies the triumph of the original parricide is reenacted on the totem animal while rituals of atonement simultaneously reaffirm the general prohibition on its killing.
This concatenation of hatred and reverence, desire and guilt,
drives the totemic system. Both general observance and ceremonial violation of the taboos work to preserve the detente between
the brothers, the first by setting down a unifying rule of order, the
second by providing means of transgression which vent the tension
built up during observance of the rule. Freud writes:
IT] he ambivalence implicit in the father-complex persists in totemism and in religions generally. Totemic religion not only
comprised expressions of remorse and attempts at atonement, it
also served as a remembrance of the triumph over the father.
Satisfaction over that triumph led to the institution of the memorial festival of the totem meal, in which the restrictions of
deferred obedience no longer held. Thus it became a duty to
repeat the crime of parricide again and again in the sacrifice of
the totem animal, whenever, as a result of the changing conditions of life, the cherished fruit of the crime - appropriation of
the paternal attributes - threatened to disappear. 8
In legal theory similar sacrificial gestures are made. Theorists, following the traditional logic of critical inquiry, first question the
possibility of rule according to law in its present manifestation and
then argue for another conceptualization which, by responding to
the changed conditions of life, promises to better preserve the underlying principles. Ambivalence finds expression, and in finding
expression rebellious and divisive tendencies are overcome, assuaged by rehearsing the power of parricide.
Although this kind of legal theory is still prevalent, the sacrifice of rule of law principles is no longer a ceremonial procedure
resulting in a universal affirmation of their virtue and utility. In a
6 Id. at 26, 29.
7 Id. at 29.
8 Id. at 180.
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tradition beginning with Holmes and running forward to critical
legal studies, critical race theory, and feminist legal theory, American theorists have become increasingly disenchanted with legal formalism as a totem and factionalism now characterizes the discourse
of the discipline. On one side are aligned adherents of the original
totemic system, more or less reverential of the principles of autonomy, objectivity and neutrality, ever faithful that the totemic system
is the best alternative to tyranny and anarchy. On the other side
are aligned a whole variety of (taboo 9 ) dissenters. Some are disbelievers, angered by their exclusion and oppression at the hands of
the original clan members, while others are disgruntled members
no longer enamored either of the taboos or the cathexis of their
ceremonial transgression. All dissenters are more or less skeptical
of the distinction between law and politics and ever intolerant of
the power effects produced by the system as is.
In short, American legal theory is in a state of revolution, perhaps even anarchy. Inherent ambivalences are no longer sated by
the old methods and the totemic system is a shambles. Traditionalists treat dissenters as taboo and warn against the threat of nihilism;
dissenters, for their part, ridicule traditionalists' naivete and warn
against blindness induced by the old faith.
Into this maelstrom steps Judge Richard Posner, whose latest
book, Overcoming Law, promises nothing less than the transcendence of totemism in legal theory, a middle path between the conflicting worship of legal formalism and legal radicalism. As Posner
announces in the Preface, the book has two corresponding parts;
one criticizes neo-traditionalists and dissenters in order to illustrate
how he thinks legal theory should not be done, the other combines
a unique version of pragmatism, economic analysis, and classical
liberalism to illustrate how he thinks legal theory should be done. 10
The critical question in reviewing Overcoming Law is whether Posner offers a true transcendence of totemism, a viable overcoming,
or merely another ceremonial sacrifice in which the totemic system
is attacked for the purposes of affirmation and reset with new
premises for the purposes of continued worship. As Freud suggests, the logic of totemism is not easily eluded, it may indeed be
endemic to the human condition:
9 On the designation of Critical Legal Studies theorists as taboo, see Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984) ("[Tihe nihilist who

must profess that legal principle does not matter has an ethical duty to depart the law
school.").
10 POSNER, supra note 1, at viii.
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Totemic religion arose from the filial sense of guilt, in an attempt to allay that feeling and to appease the father by deferred
obedience to him. All later religionsare seen to be attempts at solving
the same problem. They vary according to the stage of civilization
at which they arise and according to the methods which they
adopt; but all have the same end in view and are reactions to the same
great event with which civilization began and which, since it occurred,
has not allowed mankind a moment's rest."l
II.

TOTEMISM ORDAINED

OvercomingLaw is a revealing text in which readers seeking the
normative universe of an extremely prolific and influential legal
mind will find some measure of reward. Chapter One is a material
history of the totemic system in law. Posner offers a cartel theory
which describes the transition from a "guild" economy of legal services to an economy of "mass production" and demonstrates the relationship between these material developments and the worship
of rule of law principles in legal theory. Although it is an elite history describing the profession and its scholarship from the perspective of its elite practitioners and scholars, the chapter is worth
exploring for its illustration of the way an essentially ideological
view of the law became so entrenched (indeed we might say deified
or totemized)
as to have assumed the status of obviousness or
2
truth.1
Posner begins the chapter with a portrait of the legal profession pre-1960 in its heyday of ideological consensus.1 3 He writes,
"[t] he legal profession in its traditional form is a cartel of providers
of services related to society's laws." 14 As a cartel its primary objective is to create a monopoly by regulating to limit entry and policing to ensure high quality. These measures enable cartel members
to "increase . . . prices above competitive levels and make the
higher prices stick .... ,'s Any cartel with a desire for longevity

must therefore do two things. First, it must conceal (both to its
11 Freud, supra note 2, at 180 (emphasis added).

12 1 mean ideological in the most literal sense of a set of beliefs reflecting the
particular interests of a particular class of people - here legal professionals.
13 That Posner offers a material history of legal theory in this first chapter does not

conflict with the Freudian analysis of the introduction. Rather, the motives in both
explanations coincide. Totemism in legal theory and cartelization in the profession
each reflect a need to bring order to the exercise of power (which is the same as
creation of wealth) by establishing conditions of membership for its exercise and an
ideology to create a sense of internal consensus and external legitimacy.
14 POSNER, supra note 1, at 39.
15 Id. at 39 (citation omitted).
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own members and to society at large) its self interest in a legitimating ideology. And second, it must provide for procreation by drawing individuals into the cartel in a process that preserves the
cartel's restricted size as well as its high standards of quality.' 6
Much like the medieval guilds, Posner argues, the cartel structure of the legal profession was the result of such material interests.
Also like medieval guilds, he continues, the legal profession required a legitimating ideology. With this need for ideology the totemism of rule of law principles was born: "The profession's cartel
structure produced as a by-product a certain view of 'law' - that it
is an enigmatic but 'real' and ultimately knowable entity that by
constraining the behavior of lawyers and judges justifies the independence of the profession from political and market controls."' 7
On the basis of this ideology a whole methodology of legal reasoning developed as well as a whole system of apprenticeship designed
to indoctrinate new members into the totemic system - into the
methods, the ideology and the rewards of "law" so conceived.
Tracing the antecedents of the American legal profession's
cartel back to the English system of barristers and solicitors, Posner
dates its true genesis at 1870 when Langdell began his tenure as
dean of the Harvard Law School with a "program of educational
reform. . . explicitly based on the premise that law was a science."' 8
With the aid of other factors critical to the full flowering of the
cartel, such as state mandated bar exams and the substitution of
law school for apprenticeships, Langdell's idea of law would come
to shape the ideology of the legal profession as a whole - what we
more respectfully call its jurisprudence. Summing the primary tenets of this jurisprudence, as well as the consensus that surrounded
it, Posner writes:
Only thirty years ago the legal profession was secure in the belief
that it had cogent tools of inquiry - primarily, deduction, analogy, precedent, interpretation, rule application, the identification and balancing of competing social policies, the formulation
and application of neutral principles, and judicial restraint which added up to a methodology that could generate objectively correct answers to even the most difficult legal questions. 19
Such was the confidence and security of the profession at the time
that its "oracle," the Supreme Court, "was said to be 'predestined
16

Id. at 43.

17 Id. at 33.
18 Id. at 49 (citation omitted).

19 Id. at 34.
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• . . to be a voice of reason,' for 'reason is the life of the law."' 20
Thus Posner's theory of totemism in law is not simply that worship of rule of law principles in legal theory made democracy possible, worship also served to legitimate a monopoly on legal power (a
monopoly on its means of production) by ensuring consensus
within the profession and the perception of constraint from withOUt.21 Taboos on questioning the authority of reason and the
power of its attendant jurisprudential methods to constrain legal
decision-making worked alongside ceremonial sacrifices in which
one generation's method replaced another's madness. Yet all the
while underlying commitments to rule of law principles remained
basically unchanged. Transitions from Langdellian formalism to
sociological jurisprudence and legal realism back to legal process
as a new formalism demonstrated the profession's "remarkable capacity for domesticating, co-opting, and where necessary ignoring
its critics." 22 Indeed, Posner contends that even the radicalism of
Holmes was tamed by Justice Felix Frankfurter who "made his hero
stand for things important to professional autonomy and self-esteem but not important in Holmes's actual thinking .... -2
The primary tenet of the totemic system, then, was the worship
of reason. Whatever theoretical guise dominated the thought of
any given era, reason secured the ontological and political legitimacy of the three central rule-of-law principles (autonomy, objectivity, and neutrality in legal reasoning). These principles formed
Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
This theory bears a strong resemblance to Alexis de Tocqueville's account of the
legal profession as a mollifying aristocracy.
The more we reflect upon all that occurs in the United States, the more
we shall be persuaded that the lawyers, as a body, form the most powerful, if not the only, counterpoise to the democratic element. In that
country we easily perceive how the legal profession is qualified by its
attributes, and even by its faults, to neutralize the vices inherent in popular government. When the American people are intoxicated by passion or carried away by the impetuosity of their ideas, they are checked
and stopped by the almost invisible influence of their legal counselors.
These secretly oppose their aristocratic propensities to the nation's
democratic instincts, their superstitious attachment to what is old to its
love of novelty, their narrow views to its immense designs, and their
habitual procrastination to its ardent impatience.
ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 278 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
1990) (1835).
22 POSNER, supra note 1, at 59. No one, it seems, can get Posner to take legal
20
21

realism seriously. Thus its status as a major starting point in the demise of totemism is

relegated to the category of "ignored" criticism in Posner's narrative. See id. at 3, 20,
392-93; RMcAD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE xii, 441-42 (1990).
23 POSNER, supra note 1, at 59.
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the core of the legal profession's formalistic ideology, and at what
Posner identifies as the totemic system's high-water mark, the legal
process school exemplified the profession's commitment to
them. 4 In a fascinating section of the chapter Posner illuminates
the nature of the process school's totemic commitment by reviewing one of its representatives' discomfort with Brown v. Board of Edbelieves was shared by the
a discomfort 2Posner
ucation 5
professional elite generally.
The problem with the Brown decision was not the "rightness"
or 'justice" of its desegregation mandate, rather it was that the oracle itself revealed the fallacy of reason as the life of law in the process of reaching (indeed we might say "reaching out for") that
result. How could the profession defend its autonomy, objectivity
and neutrality - the basis of its right to monopoly power - in the
face of a decision which thrust the Supreme Court directly to the
center of the most divisive political issue in the nation's history on
the basis of a repudiation of more than a half-century of countervailing legal precedent and an utterly equivocal record on the intent of the Equal Protection Clause?26 How, in a word, could the
profession deny the transparent "madeness" of the Brown decision?
Posner argues that Herbert Wechsler's renowned article Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, reflected the interests, if
not the sentiments, of the professional elite as a response to Brown.
According to Wechsler the decision is indefensible, an example of
what not to do, but it need not impeach "the legitimacy of judicial
review," so long as that review is constrained by a search for neutral
principles in interpretation and a proper respect for procedural
and jurisdictional boundaries.2 7 "The mission of jurisprudence,"
Posner summarizes, "was to show that law was more than politics
and rhetoric," and Wechsler rose to the occasion, proposing a viable "alternative to strict construction as a guarantor of law's freedom from politics and public opinion. "28
Without mounting a defense of the Brown decision 2 9 Posner
attacks Wechsler's article as a manifestation of the weaknesses in
traditional legal theory. First, he argues that like so much legal
scholarship, factual inquiry is inexcusably absent.3 0 Second, the ar24
25
26
27
28
2
30

Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
See id. at 61-63.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 77-78.
Cf id. at 249.
Id. at 73.
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ticle mirrors the lawyer's traditional reliance on rhetorical devices,
"abstract concepts, arguments from logic, and hypothetical
cases.""' Posner writes, "Wechsler is not interested in the motives
for or the effects of segregation, except that in typical lawyer's fashion he speculates on the possibly deleterious effects of integration
- that is - the only consequences he is interested in are the speculative
bad consequences of the position that he questions.""2 Thus in the threequarters of a century separating Langdell and the ascent of law as
science from Wechsler and the legal process school, Posner concludes that formalism was the defining characteristic of legal reasoning, the centerpiece of the totemic system, and perhaps the
totem itself:
Wechsler is not at all a strict constructionist and I daresay would
not like to be called a formalist. Yet rather little of substance
separates the Harts and the Wechslers from the Langdells and
the Beales. The vocabulary is different, more modem; the
touchstones are reasonableness and institutional competence
rather than authoritative legal texts and fundamental jural concepts. But at bottom there is the same unspoken conviction that
the relations among legal concepts are rightly the focus of legal
analysis, the same unacknowledged dependence on homogeneity of outlook and of values as the real motor of consensus...
the same indifference to the empirical world, and the same antipathy to legal novelty because a genuinely new case is not continuous with precedent or the3 3other conventionally authoritative
materials for legal judgment.
Of formalism and a "totally unified conception of the law," Posner
quips, "the dream dies hard."3 4 As we will see, one of the curious
aspects of Overcoming Law is that Posner's own analysis often
manifests the traits of law's totem. The formalist's dream from
which Posner would liberate legal theory is one into which he too
sometimes slips.
III.

TOTEMISM IN CRISIS

What brought the totemic system to its present state of chaos?
Posner offers a composite of economic, social and legal factors to
explain the demise of consensus in the legal profession. Continuing his material history, Posner argues that law has undergone an
31 Id.

32
33
34

at 73.

Id. at 72-73 (emphasis added).
Id. at 75-76.

Id. at 76.
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"industrial revolution"3 5 in the last three decades which has "transformed the profession in the direction of competitive enterprise." 6 The primary cause is "a surge in demand for legal
services," which itself arose from a melange of social and legal factors.3 7 For instance, Posner offers a list tracing the liberalization of
legal services beginning with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Warren Court: "the creation of new rights, much higher
crime rates, greatly relaxed rules of standing, more generous legal
remedies... and the increased subsidization of lawyers for indigent criminal defendants and indigent civil plaintiffs .... "58 Responding to the rise in demand the profession has expanded in
size, become increasingly specialized and competitive, and abandoned both price fixing and bans on advertising. The result is a
demise of the guild culture and ethos. "Gone," Posner reflects,
"are the joys of artisanality and the security of the guild." 9
The law school - the institution responsible for the production and protection of legal ideology as well as its inculcation in
future generations of teachers and practitioners - has experienced a parallel revolution. In the totemic system "[t]he job of
the professor was to produce knowledge useful to the practitioner."4 Today however, legal scholarship has become less doctrinal, teaching methods less traditional, law faculty less
homogeneous, and traditional rule of law ideology is, as a result,
much less compelling. Posner attributes this transformation to
four primary factors: artificially high demand for law professors
and a surfeit of legal scholarship, enhanced diversity produced by
affirmative action, a dramatic rise in interdisciplinary scholarship,
and political upheavals.4 1 Combined, these factors have assaulted
the cultural homogeneity and political consensus of the profession
and in the process the autonomy, objectivity, and neutrality of legal
reasoning have all come into question. With the disintegration of
consensus legal scholarship has shifted from a relatively narrow focus on the concrete level of practice to a meta-level debate between
competing ontological accounts of the law stretched along a matrix
of continua (liberal-conservative, doctrinal-interdisciplinary, normative-positive).
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

70.
64.
64.
64.
68.
83.
102.
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Interestingly, Posner evinces no nostalgia for the loss of autonomy and objectivity in legal scholarship. He readily concedes that
"[t]he ultimate premises of legal doctrines are political," and that
without a basic consensus on underlying political questions objectivity is impossible.42 But he also knows that consensus driven by
mere homogeneity "can produce a fragile, sterile objectivity" one not worth defending.4 3 Thus insofar as the loss of consensus
and objectivity in legal theory is a product of new, vigorous, and
diversified challenges to the homogeneity of the totemic system,
Posner welcomes the revolution. Summarizing the costs and benefits, he writes, "A certain professionalism, a certain dependability, a
certain craftsmanship has been lost, but intellectual sophistication
has been gained along with a broadening of legal scholarship that
has for the first time enabled it to touch, and potentially to enrich,
neighboring fields.""
Yet Posner is not wholly content with the present situation. Indeed there are several developments with which he seems decidedly uncomfortable. First, artificially high demand for law
professors and a rise in interdisciplinary studies have combined to
encourage scholarship which has no legal utility. As Posner puts it,
"Law professors can find publication outlets for their scholarship
too easily ....

Some crazy stuff is being published in law reviews

nowadays."45 Although nowhere near as staunch as Judge Harry
Edwards in the belief that legal scholarship should only be doctrinal or otherwise "in the service of the legal profession," Posner
does claim that much of the new interdisciplinary scholarship is
simply "bad."4 6 He also worries that interdisciplinary scholarship is
weak either in its legal analysis or in its appropriation of other disciplines. Although law professors can evaluate the doctrinal aspect
of interdisciplinary pieces, there is no way to know if the "borrowed" aspect of a piece is sub-par.47
Second, Posner is extremely uncomfortable with affirmative
action - the primary cause of socio-cultural diversification in the
legal profession. He argues that efforts to increase gender, sexual
orientation, and especially racial diversity in law schools have
worked to increase representation, but at the risk of lower overall
quality in both teaching and scholarship. For instance, Posner at42
43
44
45
46
47

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 83.
at 102.
at 102.
at 101.
at 98-99.
at 101.
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tributes the declining use of the Socratic method in law school
classrooms to the presence of "less qualified on average" minority
students who, by virtue of their supposed academic inferiority, are
"more likely to be embarrassed by the 'cold call' method ... *"48
Even if the premise is true - even if minority students are on average less qualified according to the traditional criteria of undergraduate grades and LSAT scores - the conclusion that this
explains some perceived deficiency in responding to the Socratic
method is highly questionable.
A better reason, and one documented in the literature on the
subject, may be that Socratically debating legal decisions which involve issues of race 9 makes students of color less comfortable, in
part because it may require painful emotional abstraction from
what one may have experienced personally, in part because of the
frequency with which students of color feel silenced when white
students say unconscionably racist things in the guise of a Socratic
analyst, and in part because of the way white students and professors often assume people of color to be spokespersons for "the"
view of "their" race.5 ° Here it is the game theory aspect of the Socratic method which can be particularly offensive and hurtful.
But the problem of emotional abstraction is hardly unique to
students of color. It arises anytime a legal issue discussed by the
Socratic method involves a matter of emotional significance to a
student (child abuse, divorce, rape, same-sex marriage, adoption,
etc.). 5 1 Whatever its virtues,5 2 the general difficulty with the Socratic method is that it requires a student to suppress his or her
emotions in order to achieve a "neutral" analytic pose and from
there to "objectively" manipulate legal rules without regard to the
moral and emotional impact of the outcomes they would pro48 Id. at 82. According to Posner the Socratic method is not the only institutional
victim of affirmative action. "The HarvardLaw Review," he writes, "with its epicycles of
affirmative action, is on the way to becoming a laughing stalk." Id. at 77.
49 And there is seldom a legal question which does not involve issues of race.
50 See, e.g., Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Forward: Toward a Race Conscious Pedagogy in
Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1 (1989); Ann E. Freedman, Feminist Legal Method
in Action: ChallengingRacism, Sexism and Homophobia in Law Schoo4 24 GA. L. REv. 849
(1990).
51 Though even here it would appear that most emotionally charged subjects revolve around issues significant to groups who were excluded from law schools during
the dominance of the totemic system and its Socratic method. See Lani Guinier, et al.,
Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law Schoo4 143 U. PA. L. REv.
1 (1994); Freedman, supra note 50.
52 See Jennifer Howard, Learning to "Think Like a Lauyer" Through Experience, 2
CUNiCAL L. REv. 167, 172-73 (1995); Burnele V. Powell, A Defense of the Socratic Method:
An Intemriew with Martin B. Louis, 73 N.C. L. REv. 957 (1995).
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duce.5" This is bad not merely because it so frequently makes students of color, women, gays, and lesbians uncomfortable, nor
merely because it may sometimes make white men uncomfortable.
It is bad because it reinforces traditional ideas of the law, legal reasoning, and legal practice, which Posner himself criticizes. 4 But
Posner evades all this in lamenting the endangerment of the Socratic method and he attributes the evil to affirmative action without argument or evidence, as though the point is obvious, a matter
on which there is great consensus in the profession.
As to affirmative action in faculty hiring, Posner concedes that
it is properly defended with diversity and social justice rationales
but challenges Duncan Kennedy's allegedly unique assertion "that
it will raise the quality of scholarship."5 5 While Posner is confident
that economic and feminist scholarship have "improved the field"
by introducing a diversity of approaches to legal thought, he is dubious about the possibility and propriety of using race as proxy for
diversity in academic scholarship. 6 According to Posner, identifying "culturally authentic," which is to say non-assimilated, minori53 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Looking Backward, Looking Forward:A Centuiy of Legal
Change, 28 IND. L. REv. 259, 265 (1995) ("The use of [the Socratic method] practically
guaranteed a total detachment of law from politics. If there was to be any discussion
of the real world, with all its problems and conflicts, it would take place in the hallways and corridors, not in the classroom."); David Luban and Michael Millemann,
Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J LGAL Emrics 31, 62 (1995)
("[I] n the traditional Socratic method, the teacher's own ultimate judgment remains
hidden or suspended. While that doubtless teaches students to avoid premature moralizing, it never offers them examples of mature moralizing. The Socratic shell game
seems for that reason particularly ill-suited to cultivating ethical judgment."); Susan
H. Williams, Legal Education, Feminist Epistemology, and the Socratic Method, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 1571 (1993). See also Suzanne Dallimore, The Socratic Method - More Harm Than
Good, 3J. CoNTEMP. L. 177 (1977); Duncan Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REv. L. & Soc. AcriON 71 (1970); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal
Theory, CriticalLegal Studies, and Legal Education or "The Fem-CritsGo to Law School," 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 61, 67 (1988).
54 Here, I am thinking of all the tenets of formalistic legal reasoning Posner is so
eager to eliminate (i.e., the "autonomy" claim that legal materials are all one need
analyze, the "objectivity" claim that legal materials are analytic objects which can be
studied and manipulated with deductive or scientific rigor, and the "neutrality" claim
that such study is and ought to be dispassionate, divorced from one's emotional response to the issues at stake) and the fact that the Socratic method has been identified as one of the primary heuristic devices for their indoctrination. See note 53. This
is not to say that the Socratic method could never work as a means to other ends, to
inculcate other forms of legal reasoning, only that formalism has been its chief product thus far.
55 POSNER, supra note 1, at 103 (emphasis added).
56 Id. at 105. For instance, although Posner believes that the "favorite expository
technique" of critical race theory (narrative) is a "respectable genre," he believes it is
.unlikely to transform legal scholarship." Id. at 107.
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ties who will contribute their "distinctive perspective" is not the
same thing as hiring according to race per se where one may end
up with minorities "who have adopted the dominant culture."5 7 A
true commitment to diversity, he suggests, would entail discriminating against assimilated minorities and, in the case of blacks, it
would "confine most black law professors to the academic ghetto of
58
critical race theory."
Posner also argues that the greater the preference given to
black scholars in hiring, "the farther down the pool of eligibles the
law schools will have to dip to fill them, so the average quality of
black academics will fall." 9 With a rise in minority hiring would
come increased competition for the fewer nonminority slots, and
thus, "if merit criteria of selection are used, average quality will rise
... widening the gap between the two groups and fostering perceptions of minority inadequacy. "60
On the question of hiring assimilated blacks, I doubt that any
black person would characterize herself in Posner's terms as "completely assimilated to the dominant white Eurocentric culture."6"
Thus it is presumptuous at best for Posner to assume that Kennedy's desire for diversity requires any wholesale discrimination
against "assimilated" blacks. Posner appears to have bought into
the notion that critical race theory is the only "authentically" black
form of scholarship, that it would somehow be inauthentic or unblack to be a doctrinal scholar in addition to or to the exclusion of
writing about race. In this light it is worth noting that as far back as
W.E.B. DuBois one can identify at least three paradigms of black
political identity, each possessing equal "authenticity" in the sense
of having a strong basis of support in black history and consciousness: black nationalism, "assimilation through self-assertion," and
62
assimilation through "adjustment and submission."
57 Id. at 106.
58 Id. at 106.
59 Id. at 106.
60 Id. at 107.
61 Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
62 THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 34-42 (1989). Although, DuBois tentatively preferred
the second stance, he recognized that such questions of authenticity are not only
painful and complex, but question-begging, insofar as they assume any possibility of
unequivocal reply. Indeed, contemporary writers have stressed that authenticity is
most frequently employed by proponents of the dominant culture as a rhetorical and
political device to justify indifference toward, or the refusal of claims for reparation.
See, e.g., JAMES CLFFORD, PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE (1984) (discussing the way native

americans have had to appear authentic to make successful claims for land); TONI
MORRISON, SONG OF SOLOMON (1982) (demonstrating that authenticity is the require-

ment and expectation of the dominant culture in her depiction of Pilate, a black
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The real dilemma regarding affirmative action is the same axiological question that infects the analysis of post-totemic legal
scholarship generally: who and what defines quality? What, after
all, are the appropriate merit-based criteria of selection?6" Ironically this sends us right back to Posner's thesis that ideological dissensus in legal scholarship has produced evaluative dissonance in
the academy-a dissonance, recall, which he embraces:
The problem of evaluating the new legal scholarship is made
more acute by the fact that the methods and objectives in the
different fields of nondoctrinal scholarship are different. How
to compare practitioners in different fields? How to judge
whether a critical race theorist's narratives of discrimination are
superior to or inferior, as scholarship, to an economist's rational
model of discrimination? Only when the practitioners of an academic discipline agree on criteria of excellence will a discipline
...
be able to claim objectivity for its output.'
On affirmative action and interdisciplinary scholarship then, we
find Posner in an ambivalent position, simultaneously welcoming
the demise of the totemic system while revealing vestiges of its
logic. He recognizes approvingly that there is no longer any objectivity-producing consensus in legal scholarship as to what quality is,
but he then criticizes affirmative action and some forms of interdisciplinary work for lowering quality in some relevantly objective and
measurable fashion.
One way to make sense of this ambivalence and how it pervades Overcoming Law is to query Posner's strategic position in the
legal profession. As a scholar, Posner has been an outspoken
champion of law and economics, one of the most influential new
schools of thought to emerge from the ashes of the totemic system.
woman who goes from being strong and independent, to a black mammy, in order to
get a relative out of trouble with the police). Both of these examples are discussed by
Susan Willis, who notes that "[t]he dominant culture's desire for authenticity has
been enhanced rather than eroded by the mass-market.... The only culture not
required to be authentic, to replicate its past in its present, is the invisible, never
stated, but all-powerful central void of the dominant culture. Can anyone imagine
the white middle class put on trial and asked to prove its claim to property on the
basis of cultural authenticity." Susan Willis, Memory and Mass Culture, in HISToR, AND
MEMORY IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN CuuruTRE 183 (Genevieve Fabre & Robert O'Meally
eds., 1994).
63 Unfortunately, legal scholarship has not yet produced a detailed mapping of
this axiological quandary. Cf Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out
of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives,45 STAN. L. REv. 807, 840-46 (1993). Inspiration
and insight can be drawn, however, from the work of Barbara Hernstein Smith in
literary criticism - an area no less plagued by axiological disorder. See BARnARA
HERNSTEIN SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE (1988).
64 PosNER, supra note 1, at 101.
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In OvercomingLaw, Posner seeks to establish the legitimacy of economic analysis as the rightful heir to the totemic status once held
by legal formalism. To do this he must identify law and economics
with the esprit de corps which brought down the old totem, but he
must simultaneously distance himself from this spirit to demonstrate the superiority of economic analysis relative to competing
movements that also occupy the field of contemporary legal theory. The former need encourages a revolutionary tone in which
Posner is critical of the old rule of law principles, the ideologies
defending them, and the methodological blindness induced
therein; the latter, however, often forces him into a reactionary
stance where he takes the very same principles seriously in articulating the merits of economic analysis and in attacking other posttotemic movements. Unfortunately, perhaps inevitably as we will
see, in this reactionary stance Posner falls back on many of the old
formalist methodologies and manifests the same blindness he
hopes to overcome.
IV.

A.

TOTEMISM TRANSCENDED? POSNER'S MIDDLE PATH

Methods of Merit: Empiricism, Economics, and Pragmatism.
The true science of the law does not consist mainly in a theological working out of dogma or a logical development as in mathematics, or only in a study of it as an anthropological
development from the outside; an even more important part
consists in the establishment of its postulates from within
upon
65
accurately measured social desires instead of tradition.

Posner's path to overcoming "law" is decidedly Holmesian.
He aims to free legal decision-making from the bounds of tradition
and ground it in a scientific method at once empirical, pragmatic,
and consistent with classical liberal values. Like Holmes he disdains the legal profession's anti-realism - its prudish denial that a
decision's real life consequences should, and in fact do, count in
choosing between outcomes. Also like Holmes, he rejects the
methods of traditional legal reasoning insofar as they enable or encourage one to avoid confrontation with such consequences when
65 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REv. 443,
452 (1899). Most comparisons of Posner and Holmes begin with Holmes famous
essay The Path of the Law. Indeed, Posner believes that Holmes's prophecy in The Path
of the Law-that "the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of
economics"- "is in the process of being fulfilled at long last" by law and economics.
Posner, ProbLems, supra note 22 at 466. As the following subsection suggests, however,
Law in Science and Science in Law may be a better means of getting at the Holmesian
core of Posner's scientific spirit.
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it comes to so-called hard cases. 66 "[I]n our legal system," Posner
writes, "formalism is an unworkable response to difficult cases."6 7
Logic, precedent, analogy, plain meaning, originalism, are all part
of the traditionalist's arsenal of denial. As Holmes puts it:
The theory of the law as to any possible conduct is that it is
either lawful or unlawful. As that difference has no gradation
about it, when applied to shades of conduct that are very near
each other it has an arbitrary look. We like to disguise the arbitrariness, we like to 6save
ourselves the trouble of nice and doubt8
ful discriminations.
Thus both Posner and Holmes agree that where underlying values
conflict and legal doctrines are not clear judges are called on to
"exercise the sovereign prerogative of choice." 69
70
Rather than hide this choice in the garb of "empty phrases"
66 Holmes defines hard cases as the result of a conflict between two conflicting
social desires. "[W]henever a doubtful case arises, with certain analogies on one side
and other analogies on the other... what is really before us is a conflict between two
social desires, each of which seeks to extend its dominion over the case, and which
cannot both have their way." Holmes, supra note 65, at 460. It has been argued that
Posner's enthusiasm for economic analysis, particularly the theory of wealth maximization, has become more cautious because he has conceded that a great proportion of the cases judges handle are easily decided. The implication is that only in
hard cases where none of the traditional judicial materials reveal the "right" answer
would economic methods be wheeled in. But this is an uncontroversial concession
given that the measure and the limit of any legal theory's success is what it says about
deciding hard cases. As Posner is well aware, these are the most pressing problems of
jurisprudence. Although Posner is more cautious in Overcoming Law about suggesting
that wealth-maximization is the solution to all hard cases, he has not stepped back
from earlier claims that it is the best tool for judges to use. Indeed, his criticism of
other methods is so broad, one gets the sense wealth maximization is the only thing
Posner intends to leave standing. POSNER, supra note 1, at 22-23.
67 POSNER, supra note 1, at 12.
68 Holmes, supra note 65, at 457.
69 Id. at 461. Posner's argument for limited judicial activism goes as follows:
The multi-layered character of American law (legislation superimposed
on common law, federal law superimposed on state law, and federal
constitutional law superimposed on state and federal statutory and common law), the undisciplined character of our legislatures, the intricacy
and complexity of our society, and the moral heterogeneity of our population combine to thrust on the courts a responsibility for creative lawmaking that cannot be discharged either by applying existing rules to
the letter or by reasoning by analogy - the standard judicial technique
for dealing with novelty - from existing cases.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 12-13. See also id. at 231.
70 Of the reliance on "empty phrases" in legal reasoning, Holmes writes:
My object is not so much to point out what seems to me to be fallacies in
particular cases as to enforce by various examples and in various applications the need of scrutinizingthe reasonsfor the rules which we follow, and of
not being contented with hollow forms of words merely because they have been
used very often and have been repeatedfrom one end of the union to the other.
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-incantations of rules which may have lost their connection to the
"felt necessities of the time"-Holmes would have judges look to
science to measure and compare underlying social desires. Posner's theory of jurisprudence gives content to Holmes's scientific
aspirations by positing economics as the proper method to do the
work of measurement and comparison. If "it is for science to determine, so far as it can, the relative worth of our different social
ends,"7 1 Posner believes economic analysis, fitted with a pragmatist
epistemology, is best suited to the task. Law and economics, he
claims, "epitomizes the operation in law of the ethic of scientific
inquiry, pragmatically understood. Its project . .. is to construct
and test models of human behavior for the purpose of predicting
and (where appropriate) controlling that behavior."7 2 Not only
does economics predict human behavior, it does so in a way that
measures the cost, what Holmes called the relative worth, of social
desirables. Hence Posner is confident that "[m]odern economics
can furnish the indispensable theoretical
framework for the empir73
ical research that law so badly needs."
Why is Posner, following Holmes, so intent upon infusing the
law with empiricism? His hope is that an economic social science
can navigate a safe passage between the Scylla of formalism and the
Charybdis of legal radicalism, that it can facilitate the rejection of
traditional rule of law principles without simultaneously having to
concede that "law is politics all the way down" 74 and reject the rule
of law itself. After all, Posner thinks the rule of law has significant
utility in liberal societies: "The rule of law, in the sense of a system
of social control operated in accordance with norms of disinterestedness and predictability, is a public good of immense value.
Along with a market economy and a democratic political system,
which in fact it undergirds, it is a presupposition of modern liberalism."75 Thus although joining the general assault on the totemic
system, Posner parts company with "bad-boy legal realists . .. and
76
their crit epigones who deny that law has any principles."
We must think things not words, or at least we must constantly translate
our words into the facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the
real and the true.
Holmes, supra note 65, at 460 (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 462.
72 POSNER, supra note 1, at 15-16.
73 POSNER, supra note 1, at 19.
74 Mark Tushnet, Citical Legal Studies: A Political History, YAuE LJ. 1515, 1526
(1991).
75 POSNER, supra note 1, at 20.
76 Id. at 20.
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The theory of judging which emerges from this middle road is
one of the central contributions of Overcoming Law. It begins with a
pragmatic epistemology, the first element of which is a deep commitment to consequentialism, especially its rejection of foundationalist premises.7 7 In law, consequentialism posits that the
autonomy, objectivity, and neutrality of legal reasoning canriot be
defended on purely analytical or theoretical grounds. " [J ] udicial
decision," Posner reminds us, "predates articulate theory. "78
Therefore, autonomy exists only as a legal fiction (legal reasoners
are consummate borrowers), objectivity is made in the foundry of
consensus, not guaranteed by the universality of reason, and neu79
trality is rendered by acknowledging the role of intuition, common sense, bias s ° even instinct, 8 1 and checking them with facts
rather than pretending these forces do not exist.8 2 Legal outcomes, then, are just not by virtue of their formal coherence, but
rather by virtue of their ultimate consequences, their ability to
match means (rules) to concrete ends (social desires).
The second element of Posner's pragmatic epistemology,
which follows from the first, is a commitment to empiricism.
Holmes was not the only turn of the century pragmatist who believed that democracy requires a mature social science to inform
the structure of its laws. John Dewey was also noted for his plea
that democracy be a scientific endeavor. Like Dewey, Posner promotes empiricism as an ethos, a spirit of open-minded inquiry and
77 Foundationalism relies on a correspondence theory of truth. It posits that ideas
can be grounded independent of human experience and contingency. "Pragmatism," Posner states, "emphasizes the social over the natural." Id. at 7. It "is formed to
engender doubt about all philosophical foundations, but not necessarily in order to
upset the practices that appear to rest on them - rather to show that they do not rest
on them, that their validity depends on the evaluation of their consequences rather
than on their having foundations; that metaphors drawn from the building trades do
not illuminate the justification of social institutions." Id. at 463.
78 Id. at 194.
79 "Even our most tenaciously held 'truths' are not those that can be proved,
probed, discussed, investigated ....
A proof is no stronger than its premises, and at
the bottom of a chain of premises are unshakable intuitions, our indubitables,
Holmes's 'can't helps.'" Id. at 5.
80 "[A] judge's philosophical or religious or economic or political views are bound
to shape his response to specific cases in the open area where judicial decisionmaking
is critical." Id. at 197.
81 "[I]nstinct," claims Posner, "can be a surer guide to action than analysis." Id. at
194.
82 "[P]ersonal values," Posner writes, "while influenced by temperament and upbringing, are not independent of adult personal experience. Research - into facts,
not just what judges have said in the past - can substitute for experience, enlarge
and correct the factual materials on which temperament and outlook react, and thus

bring home to a judge the realities of a law. .

...

" Id. at 195.
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83
attention to facts, however socially constructed they may be.
"The responsible judge," he writes, "will not be content with a naked statement of values. . . . [H]e will seek to inform himself
through empirical inquiry more searching than is normal in judicial opinions. Prudence dictates that before you react strongly to
something you try to obtain as clear an idea as possible what that
something is."84 This transition from anti-foundationalism to empiricism is also summed nicely in a passage regarding the indeterminacy of constitutional interpretation:
One cannot choose among these interpretations on semantic or
conceptual grounds. Choice must be based on which interpretation seems best in a sense that includes but also transcends
considerations of fidelity to a text and a tradition. The interpretative question is ultimately a political, economic, or social one
85
to which social science may have more to contribute than law.
Where traditionalists suppressed the role of intuition and bias
in legal decision-making Posner concedes that their role is inevitable. Where legal realists and their offspring tout various ideological paradigms for decision makers to adopt in considering
consequences, Posner offers an economic social science. As the
graphic below demonstrates, his theory of decision-making may indeed be a middle way, providing a means of extending legal reasoning beyond its traditional methods and materials without
sacrificing rule of law virtues (i.e., objectivity, neutrality, constraint,
stability, and predictability). Judges, according to Posner's scheme,
can finally apply legal rules to reality and keep the law apace with
social change without renouncing the possibility of constraint and
succumbing to the charge of illegitimate activism.

83 Id. at 331. On Dewey's vision of democracy and science see Margaret Jane Radin, A Dezweyan Perspective on the Economic Theory ofDemocracy, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 539
(1994-1995). See also Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Pragmatism, Policy Science and the
State in II JOHN DEwEY. CarcAL ASSESSMENTS 244-66 (J. E. Tiles ed., 1992); ALAN
RYAN, JOHN DEwEY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 86-87 (1995).
84 POSNER, supra note 1, at 192-93. See also POSNER, supra note 22, at 465 ("law
needs more of the scientific spirit than it has - the spirit of inquiry, challenge, fallibilism, open-mindedness, respect for fact, and acceptance of change").
85 PosNR, supra note 1, at 207.
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TRADITIONALIST THEORY OF DECISION-MAKING

intuition/bias (suppressed)
+ cases/statutes/other legal materials
+ logic/other forms of discretely legal reasoning
= judicial opinion
LEGAL REALIST THEORY OF DECISION-MAKING

intuition/bias
+ cases/statutes/other legal materials
+ consequences (ideologically perceived)
= judicial opinion
POSNER'S PRAGMATIC THEORY OF DECISION-MAKING

intuition/bias
+ cases/statutes/other legal materials
+ consequences (scientifically examined)
= judicial opinion

Of course, whether Posner's theory is possible in practice is a critical question. Perhaps the best way to answer it is to query how
Posner himself employs the theory, to ask, in other words, whether
in his hands it provides a true middle way or yet another incarnation of the totemic system.
B.

Totemism Reinscribed.
1.

Empiricism as a rhetorical device.

In Overcoming Law the empirical inadequacy of contemporary
legal theory becomes a familiar trope. As Posner surveys theorists,
ranging from Ronald Dworkin and John Hart Ely to Patricia Williams and Martha Minow, his assessment often turns on whether
the theory being pitched is grounded in fact or ideological fiction.
He complains, for instance, that " [ c] onstitutional lawyers know little about their proper subject matter - a complex of political, social, and economic phenomena. They know only cases. An
exclusive diet of Supreme Court opinions," he continues, "is a recipe for intellectual malnutrition."8 6
In one example, Posner offers a criticism of two articles on the
DeShaney case. In DeShaney, the Supreme Court held that the failure of a publicly funded social worker to remove a child from the
custody of an unmistakably abusive father before the child was
beaten into a vegetative state was not a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause. 87 Posner indicates that the case
86 Id. at 208.
87 Id. at 208.
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turned on a distinction between positive and negative liberty, that
the Court held the Fourteenth Amendment protects "negative liberty - the right to be let alone by the state - rather than positive
liberty, the right to state services.""8 He then turns to an article by
David Strauss which argues that the Court should have held the
social worker liable under a positive liberty concept of the due process requirement. Claiming that Strauss does nothing to examine
the consequences which would result if the Court had decided the
case on these grounds, Posner's admonition is harsh:
Now as it happens the University of Chicago Law School, where
Strauss teaches, is one block east of the university's School of
Social Service Administration, the nation's premier school of social work. A two minute walk would have brought Strauss into
the presence of experts with whom to explore the practical
con89
sequences of a decision the other way in DeShaney.
Strauss' thesis, coming as it does without consequentialist analysis beyond the confines of the case's facts, becomes for Posner a
perfect example of overly ambitious constitutional theorists who
are capable of manipulating legal doctrine but lack any substantive
expertise relevant to the diverse social arenas in which the doctrinal issues arise. Indeed, Posner suggests that Strauss may actually
only be interested in the DeShaney case insofar as it provides an
attractive set of facts upon which to construct a compelling normative claim for positive liberty in due process analysis. 90 If this is
true, Strauss's thesis is merely another abstract theoretical salvo in
the ideological battle between positive and negative concepts of liberty - a model of an alternative decision that mimics the Court's
ignorance of empirical consequences and thus repeats in legal
scholarship the formalism of traditional judicial decision making.
"Too many constitutional scholars," Posner laments, "conceive
their role as that of shadow judges, writing in the guise of articles,
alternative judicial opinions in Supreme Court cases."9 1
Amar and Widawsky's suggestion that the social worker in
DeShaney could have been held liable under the Thirteenth
Amendment, if child abuse were conceived as a form of slavery,
fares little better. Here, Posner is most concerned about "metaphorical," as opposed to "literal," readings of key constitutional
phrases. The danger, not surprisingly, is that metaphorical read88 Id. at 208 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S.
189 (1989)).
89 Id. at 209.
90 Id. at 210.
91 Id. at 210.
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ings divorce key terms from their history and intent, effectively
"remov[ing] any textual check to constitutional interpretation."9 2
Again, Posner is witty, if sharp, in reply. To the suggestion that
"'the state turned a blind eye to de facto slavery within its jurisdiction and violated the Amendment,"' Posner quips, "'The state' did
not know anything. A social worker employed by the state stupidly
though not maliciously failed to remove DeShaney from his father's custody. Is Wisconsin therefore a slave state?""3
Posner is less concerned with the viability of analogizing child
abuse to slavery than with the fact that other analogies are equally
plausible. A choice between analogies is almost always required,
and, by Posner's lights, the choice can only be meaningfully informed by taking into account the same empirical issues Strauss
ignored.9 4 As with Strauss, Posner is especially troubled by Amar
and Widawsky's expansive interpretive approach because it fails to
address the practical consequences, the actual social costs, such an
expansion would entail. Speaking of liberal constitutional theorists
generally, Posner concludes wryly, "Implicitly they assume that the
incremental social cost of indefinitely expanding federal judicial
capacity is zero. They have no sense of priorities. They are piecemeal analysts, like the judges themselves."9 5
The move to practical consequences is attractive for a number
of reasons. First of all, it replaces a false sense of autonomy in legal
reasoning with a more promising connection to the actual effects
such reasoning produces. Rather than allow judges and theorists
to disguise their normative stance in empty phrases, an empirical
approach forces some measure of accountability into the calculus.
Second, depending on the relative hardness of the facts at stake
(which is a reflection of the degree of consensus they engender) a
commitment to practical consequences introduces the possibility
of objective analysis where at present, there is a seemingly interminable war of "all against all" on the level of legal ideology. Finally,
depending on the relative universality and fixity of the methods
employed, a commitment to empiricism promises some measure of
neutrality since it can check with facts the biases introduced by intuition and ideology.
But before embracing Posner's empiricism it is worth noting
the inconsistency with which it is applied in Overcoming Law.
92
93
94
95

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

212.
213 (citation omitted).
213.
214.
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Although almost every theorist surveyed is accused of having a
"weak sense of fact," 96 Posner makes a number of statements which
either have no basis in fact or go unsupported in the text. For
example, Posner's confidence in liberalism and science sometimes
verges on blind faith. Havingjust championed the scientist "not as
the discoverer of ultimate truths . . . but as the exposer of falsehoods,"9 7 Posner makes a facile distinction to explain the disparity
in relative health and financial well-being among nations of the
world. He states emphatically, "Societies that refuse to play the science game suffer various consequences, including high levels of
poverty and illness and an acute risk of being dominated or destroyed by other societies. Those consequences are important to
the pragmatist, and a society that ignores them may be inflicting
great suffering on its people ... .""8 The proposition that societies
refusing to play the science game suffer a harder lot may be true,
but the cause of this suffering is not to be found, at least not as an
initial matter, in their refusal to play the science game. Quite the
contrary, it is to be found in the actions of societies already playing
the science game without respect for the consequences the game
has on others. Posner's argument otherwise is a staggering empirical slip. The majority of contemporary "suffering" societies that
"refuse" to "play the science game" are post-colonial - the product
of western scientific and economic intrusion or exploitation.
Moreover, Posner's analysis inverts colonialist logic in a way
that suggests the colonized are wholly responsible for their fate. It
is "their" refusal to play the science game, not the actions of science game players, which explains "their" oppressed condition.
This assumes either the moral or the practical superiority of the
science game in a context in which many societies have ample reason to question both its merits and the motives of those who promote it. Indeed, the initial distinction Posner draws begs the
question of what the science game is. Although Posner seems relatively convinced that science has to do with a process of falsification or of "narrow[ing] the area of human uncertainty by
generating falsifiable hypotheses and confronting them with
data,"9 9 others well versed in the so-called science game have ofId. at 205, 298, 311, 367, 377.
Id. at 6. Elsewhere, Posner makes clear his belief in the affinity between liberalism and science: "[T]he strongest link between science and liberalism ... is not a
love of abstraction; it is a belief, which is fundamental both to scientific progress and
to political liberty, in the virtues of free inquiry." Id. at 331.
98 Id. at 8.
99 Id. at 6.
96
97
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fered compelling definitions of its rules that would make the "religion games" played by the societies Posner labels unscientific more
difficult to distinguish.'
It is important to note that the difficulty
here need not even be that Posner's distinction and conclusions
are false,' it is enough to show that they go unsubstantiated in a
book that both criticizes inattention to facts in others and promotes the science game as a superior legal method. Whether the
science game is the way out of suffering for certain societies, or just
another form of suffering (i.e., cultural rather than economic or
political), is indeed a partly empirical question. Nevertheless, the
facts on this issue, as well as their moral and social implications, are
10 2
controverted and deeply contested.
Another slip arises in Posner's discussion of whether "liberalism should be thought antagonistic to feminism." 03 Beginning
from the position that "[w] omen have fared much better in liberal
societies than in traditional or otherwise antiliberal ones," Posner
goes on to attribute this success to the economic and scientific progress that liberalism engenders. 10 4 Dismissing male dominance
theories put forth by feminist legal scholars, he claims that the key
to women's emancipation has been technological progress rather
than a shift in social values or beliefs. "[W]hat," Posner queries,
"enabled women to throw off, if not all their chains, many of them?
The economist can point to the expansion of jobs in the service
sector, improved household labor saving devices, improvements in
contraception, and other economic or technological factors as
causes of women's increasing emancipation from dependence on
100 See e.g., RICHARD RORTY, Science as Solidarity and Is Science a NaturalKind? in OBRELATIVISM, AND TRUTH 35-62 (1991) (arguing that "science" merely
designates a commitment to persuasion or "unforced agreement" rather than any
"special set of methods" or any "special relation to reality"). See also Roland Barthes,
claiming that "the object of science is any material society deems worthy of being
transmitted. In a word, science is what is taught." ROLAND BARTHES, THE RUSTLE OF
LANGUAGE 3 (1984) (emphasis added). Given contemporary transformations in scientific methodology, the Popperian idea of science, embraced by Posner, may be an
outdated paradigm. SeeJAMEs GLEicK, CHAOS: MAING A NEW SCIENCE (1987).
101 Indeed, some of them are quite true. Some post-colonial countries have embraced the science game to their benefit. See, e.g., ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE
MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIA (1990) (discussing the rapid industrial success of Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong).
102 See, e.g., MARY LOUISE PRATT, IMPERIAL EYES: TRAVEL WRITING AND TRANSCULTURATION 15-107 (1992) (discussing, from a critical perspective, the proliferation of the
science game during the period of western imperialism). See also, JAMAICA KINCAID, A
SMALL PLACE 23-37 (1988) (commenting on the absurdity of expecting the adoption
of capitalist values in the post-colonial West Indies).

jECTlrrv,

103 POSNER, supra note 1, at 329.
104 Id. at 329.
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men. To what," he then demands, "can the dominance theorist
point? Her own writings?" °5 Moreover, any shift in the ideology
of women's place in society is attributed to the political and social
force of liberalism. Posner claims that liberalism has "created a
friendlier climate for the emancipation of women from traditional
bonds and prescribed roles" because it is "antagonistic to immutable status, restricted entry into occupations, and the infusion of
religious dogma into political decision-making. "106
This is all a plausible theoretical account of women's emancipation, but it fails as an empirical account because it makes the
liberation of women seem a predestined or natural consequence of
liberalism, economics, and the science game. It is as though Posner believes as a matter of common sense that technology and liberal ideology work as a kind of irrepressible liberating force in
history, for his assertions here come without data to back them up.
Posner simply assumes the superior condition of women in liberal
societies without offering any evidence of clear standards by which
to objectively measure the relative emancipation of women in societies with different political structures and underlying cultures.
There is actually a great deal of debate about whether such comparative questions can ever be meaningfully answered, not merely
because the concepts of liberalism and technological progress are
indeterminate, but also because the concepts of subordination and
10 7
emancipation are hotly contested.
One would expect Posner, as a pragmatist, to be particularly
sensitive to these underlying terminological debates in evaluating
the legal scholarship of feminists.10 8 One would also expect him,
as an empiricist, to be particularly cautious in making generalizaId. at 356. See also, id. at 329-30.
Id. at 330.
107 See, e.g., Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "PoliticalEconomy" of Sex in
TowARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN (Rayna R. Reiter ed., 1975); Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen, Internal Criticism and Indian Rationalist Traditions in RELATIVISM:
INTERPRETATION AND CONFRONTATION 326 -38 (Michael Krausz ed., 1989). Cf Bimal
Krishna Matilal, EhticalRelativism and Confrontation of Cultures in RELATIVISM: INTERPRETATION AND CONFRONTATION 339-62 (1989).
108 Pragmatism means many things to many people, but Posner seems to contradict
his own definition of pragmatism in these passages on women, the science game, and
liberalism:
Pragmatism, in the sense that I find congenial means looking at
problems concretely, experimentally, without illusions, with full awareness of the limitations of human reason, with a sense of the "localness" of
human knowledge, the difficulty of translations between cultures, the unattainability of "truth," the consequent importance of keeping diverse
paths of inquiry open, the dependence of inquiyy on culture and social institutions, and above all the insistence that social thought and action be eval105
106
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tions about what "liberal societies" do absent concrete corroborative information. The reality of liberalism in practice, whatever its
ideals, and the degree of emancipation women have achieved
within it, seem considerably less pristine than Posner's analysis suggests. It is just this point about liberalism that feminist legal scholars have tried to make.
The difficulty with Posner's willingness to make and rely on
generalizations which ignore or suppress empirical complexity becomes especially evident once his analysis shifts to an issue of contemporary concern in the emancipation of women, namely,
whether women should be allowed to serve in the armed forces. In
addressing this question Posner falls back on biology and technology to explain women's exclusion from service and to deny that
ideologies of male domination play any significant role. He writes:
I do not find it plausible to suppose that women were excluded
from the combat branches of the armed forces until recently
because of phallocracy. Recent changes in the technology of
warfare have reduced the role of brawn, stamina, and aggressiveness. The armed forces' demand for people able to march
through mud carrying hundred-pound packs on their backs and
to kill at short range with fists or knives or rifle butts or submachine guns has not vanished, but it has shrunk. We live in an
age of0 ush-button warfare. Women can push buttons as well as
men.
The implication here is that feminists want to blame men for
womens' exclusion and oppression when, in fact, it was only neutral biological forces (women are weaker, less aggressive, etc.) that
necessitated their exclusion. Since the causes were in fact neutral,
the logic continues, the effects are not properly labeled oppressive
and attributed to men - the problem was not phallocracy, a will to
dominate. Moreover, technology, another neutral, physical force,
is properly credited with emancipation, not any history of social or
political struggle on the part of women directed at changing the
consciousness of men and the structures of institutions they
controlled.
Not only is this kind of biological and material determinism a
strange bedfellow for a professed pragmatist, it rings particularly
hollow as a refutation of so-called feminist "dominance theorists"
because it comes without any factual evidence to back it up. Inuated as instruments to valued human goals rather than ends in
themselves.
PosNER, supra note 22, at 465 (emphasis added).
109 PosNER, supra note 1, at 355.
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deed it smacks of the same kind of phallocratic assumptions about
women - their emotional and physical propensities, and the roles
they are "capable" of performing in society - which Posner denies
are relevant to their emancipation. 1 0
The difficulty raised by each of these examples is that what
seems obvious to Posner by virtue of common sense' is not subjected to empirical scrutiny in Overcoming Law - a book that takes
the sword of empiricism to battle against every major form of legal
theory. As a pragmatist, Posner is aware that common sense is but
a "lay term" for a person's "frame of reference," that indispensable
quantum of "unshakable intuition" which colors one's interpretive
universe and all the "facts" lying within. He also knows that any
good pragmatist "is both for and against common sense;"'2 for
common sense because it always operates in the formation of beliefs and decisions; against it because common sense can change,
can be changed, by deeper inquiry or experience.
The trouble with a commitment to pragmatic empiricism is
that nothing about it tells us when to take common sense for
granted and when to challenge it. There is a constant tension between the questioning, which arises from a desire to change the
prevailing consensus by exposing its latent biases, and the reliance
which arises from a desire, whether conscious or not, to accept the
prevailing consensus and suppress its biases. Ironically, the resolution of this tension by any given theorist often reflects the biases of
his or her frame of reference, the prejudices of his or her common
sense. It also defines his or her relationship to the status quo.
What is commonly accepted can either be grounds for comfort and
confidence (the pejorative forms being apathy/indifference and
conservatism) or it can generate resistance and inspire transformative efforts (the pejorative forms here being paralyzing cynicism
and detached idealism).
In Posner's case, this tension plays out with criticism of most
contemporary forms of legal theory and empathy for economic
theory. Posner would, for instance, "clip the wings" of contempo110 Cf id. at 5.
111 A partial list of the "obvious by virtue of common sense" is: (1) that affirmative
action is the primary cause of the decline in the Socratic method; (2) that liberalism is
more liberating for women than other societies; (2) that this liberation is in fact due
to liberalism and science; (4) that child abuse is not in any useful sense analogous to
slavery; (5) that due process liberty is negative; and (6) that there are unscientific
societies who suffer needlessly by virtue of their refusal to embrace western politics
and praxis.
112 Id. at 5.
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rary constitutional theorists by forcing them to narrow their focus
and to get empirical on the issues they address.1 1 3 He would also
have feminist legal scholars, critical race theorists, and
postmodernists remedy their "flight from fact" by augmenting their
theories with empirical research." 4 On the other hand, renowned
economic theorists such as Milton Friedman are excused both for
their theoretical breadth and for their lack of empirical analysis.
Posner writes:
It shows no disrespect to Friedman to point out that he has not
conducted any detailed, painstaking case studies of the subject
matter of his policy positions outside of the fiscal and monetary
areas and ... professional licensure. He arrived at those positions as a matter of theory. Had he followed the case-study
route his range would have
been narrower and economics
l1 5
would be poorer as a result.
Posner has equal sympathy for the theoretical work of Gary Becker
on household production. Calling Becker "a formidable theorist,"
Posner notes that Becker's primary assumption "that people are
rational maximizers of their satisfactions... has guided fruitful empirical work."" 6 For this reason, he concludes, "We need not regret the absence of economic case studies of individual families."" 7
The bias in favor of economic theorists - the latitude Posner
is willing to give them in evaluating their contributions - runs beyond the question of empiricism to their mode and style of expression. Postmodernists, Posner announces, "write in an ugly,
impenetrable jargon, sometimes with the excuse that to write
clearly is to buy into the Enlightenment mythology of unmediated
communication between author and reader."" 8 On the use of
math in the writing of economists, however, Posner encourages
great deference, admonishing those who would be dismissive on
account of its (arguably ugly and impenetrable) jargon:
Mention of mathematics raises a larger question, that of complexity versus simplicity in expression. Many people believe with
Orwell that writing ought to be as clear as a windowpane, implying simple words and short sentences. For many purposes this is
true. But it is not universally true.... [L]imiting the range of one's
vocabulary can limit the range of one's thought. A larger,richervocabu113
"4

115
116
117
118

Id. at 209.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 432-33.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 317.
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lary, even a more intricatesyntax, may enable a greater understanding.
Modem-day economics may overdo math, but it is not true
that mathematics
is simply an obscurantist mode of
11 9
communication.
Adam Smith's invisible-hand theory and Darwin's theory of natural
selection Posner continues, are "extremely simple ... once grasped
[they] seem (though not to everyone) completely intuitive and obviously correct." 120 He then goes on to associate Ronald Coase's
1 21
theory of transaction costs with this tradition of "simple theory."
Postmodernist tendencies, however, "can lead an author away from
clear-headed analysis of social institutions and into a terminologi122
cal miasma."
The point here is not just to show that Posner is inconsistent
in the application of his empiricist critique, nor is it to show that
the inconsistency has a bias that works in favor of the type of legal
theory he prefers. The point is to expose the danger of a complacent pragmatism in which empiricism becomes a rhetorical device
no more valid as a method of legal reasoning than the rhetorical
devices of traditional legal theorists. Because pragmatism relies on
consensus for its claim to objectivity there is always a danger that
what comes to enjoy the status of the objective is based more on
homogeneity of outlook than truly exhaustive and self-critical scientific inquiry. The ever-present danger, in short, is an epistemological tyranny of the majority.
Pragmatism is always susceptible to this danger, even, perhaps
especially, when it turns to the world of fact. The positive, the empirical, is no less ideologically constructed than the normative.
Retrospectively, social science regularly produces "bad facts" which
have formed the basis for unjust action. Holmes himself, while famous for many great decisions, is also notorious for his opinion in
Buck v. Bell, where he unflinchingly declared that "three generations of imbeciles is enough" in upholding a Virginia sterilization
law with explicit origins in the eugenics movement.1 2 3 Indeed, history is replete with the blunders of empiricism, instances where
what was so confidently taken as fact turned out to be fiction, a
119 Id. at 311 (emphasis added). Cf id. at 526 (where Posner concedes that scientists employ rhetorical devices "to bolster their authority"). Following the concession,
though, is a comment that such devices are less likely either to be employed or unwittingly accepted by a pragmatist. Id.
120 Id. at 418.
121
122
123

Id. at 418.
Id. at 318.
274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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mere rhetorical device in the garb of truth or reason or reality.'2 4
One may believe that the benefits of a pragmatic empiricism
outweigh the costs, that as society becomes more sophisticated, so
will its science, but this requires a leap of faith many victims of bad
social science can ill afford. (I am thinking here especially of those
groups who have suffered from the ascription of bad facts on a
continuing basis such as women, gays, lesbians, and people of
color.) It may, after all, be a leap of faith none of us should be
willing to take. Posner's pragmatism presupposes an openness to
corrective experience, but this openness itself assumes a margin of
error the breadth of which may be radically different for law versus
science. Lives only infrequently, and then often indirectly, hang in
the balance where scientific experimentation is concerned. In law,
however, lives almost always hang directly in the balance. As Robert Cover reminds us, "[1]egal interpretation takes place in a field
of pain and death."'2 5 Our willingness to wait for corrective experience, then, may rightly be weaker in law than in science.
Posner's pragmatism tries to recognize the social construction
of facts in order to liberate legal theory in general, and economic
analysis in particular, from its traditional foundationalist moorings.
Following the pragmatic moves of Holmes and Dewey, he offers
empiricism as a method that can save legal theory from relativism
and radicalism. But in order to make empiricism compelling, Posner must deny the degree to which social construction can so
change the nature of facts for different communities inhabiting the
same legal space that empiricism becomes a fictive device, incapable of providing either the objectivity or the constraint law requires
26
to keep its distance from politics.
124 The eugenics movement is a compelling example. On the relation between the
eugenics movement and the contemporary "scientific" study of racial differences see
WILIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND Po-Ics OF RAcLAL RESEARCH (1994). Posner

appears not to have any serious qualms with such research. Indeed, he characterizes
those who do have qualms with it as misguided adherents of political correctness:
If you show a player in [the political correctness] game a sheaf of scientific reports purporting to show that the races or the sexes differ in their
potential for doing mathematics, the player will refuse to read them; the
empirical investigation of racial and sexual differences is rejected in
that game, just as the empirical investigation of planetary motion was
rejected by Bellarmine [the Cardinal who refused to look through
Galileo's telescope at the moons of Jupiter because their existence
seemed to refute the orthodox view that the planets were fixed to the
surface of crystalline spheres].
POSNER, supra note 1, at 7.

125 Vwolee and the Word,95 YALE LJ. 1601 (1986).
126 This ambivalence or tension in Posner's pragmatism was noted in a review of
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A vigilant anti-foundationalist pragmatism, one ever suspicious
of common sense and consensus, holds some promise. But Posner
himself demonstrates the strength of the temptation to take "can't
helps" for granted, to work from, rather than against, or in spite of
them. He cannot help preferring economic discourse to
postmodernist discourse, cannot help doubting the veracity of Patricia Williams' stories,12 7 cannot help believing biology, not misogyny, was the key limitation on women's freedom. Insofar as
Posner's "can't helps" are America's "can't helps" there may be littie cause for concern-a community of consensus may exist to
which those who disagree with Posner must either adjust or pose a
credible challenge. But this is an inference legitimately ventured
only on the most solid of empirical documentation. And even if it
were true that such a community of consensus exists, would that
prove a legitimate victory in the marketplace of ideas, or just a tyranny of the majority against which the very theorists Posner attacks
are struggling for recognition?
2.

Formalism and economics.

Posner must concede that economic analysis has formalistic
elements. It is, after all, a formal theory that works from abstract
assumptions about human beings in order to better predict their
behavior.1 2 1 Yet he is more cautious about whether it fits the criteria of legal formalism (autonomy, objectivity, and neutrality). If
the most formalistic aspect of traditional legal theory was its claim
to autonomy, Posner
is right that law and economics is not the
"new Langdellism."12 9 Economic analysis of law "almost by definition denies law's autonomy." 130 It rejects the idea that legal reasonThe Problems of Jurisprudenceby Stanley Fish. Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard
Posner'sJurisprudence,57 U. Cm.L. REv. 1447, 1459-62 (1990).
127 PosNER, supra note 1, at 373-77.
128 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 61 ("Having criticized legal formalism at such
length I should make clear that I am not opposed to all formalism.... Economics has
its formalist side ....Abstracting from particulars is an essential part of science; so in a
sense all science, not just economic science, is formalist.").
129 Id. at 18. In The Problems ofJurisprudenc Posner again tries to cabin legal formalism as commitment to autonomy:
The most useful sense of this protean term, however, derives from the
contrast between form and substance - form referring to what is internal to law, substance to the world outside of law, as in the contrast between formal and substantive justice. The autonomy and objectivity of
law are secured by confining legal analysis to the formal level, the level
requiring only an exploration of the relations among legal ideas.
PosNER, supra note 22, at 4.
130 PosNEit, supra note 1, at 18.

1842

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:1810

ing is an independent discipline free of the need to borrow from
other fields to enhance its analytic power. It also rejects the idea
that law either does or should evolve as an internal system according to its own logic "rather than in response to political and economic pressures."'' And although economic analysis is a
deductive system like Langdellian logic, Posner is quick to distinguish the two methods on the grounds that the former is falliblist,
insistent upon empirical verification and open to revision based on
corrective experience. "Langdell," he writes, "wanted to stop with
deduction-with comparing the facts of a case to a rule derived
from a priori concepts ....The economist is committed to testing
his theories empirically and discarding them if falsified by data."3 2
Nevertheless, it is still worth asking whether Posner's economic analysis escapes the bad traits of legal formalism merely because it introduces an interdisciplinary empirical method-worth
asking because, as Posner has commented elsewhere, "It]he only
prerequisite to being a formalist is having supreme confidence in
one's premises and in one's methods of deriving conclusions from
them." 13

Rational actors and reified abstractions. The notion that human
beings are rational maximizers of their wants in life is the centerpiece of economic analysis. Interestingly, Posner claims that the
assumption need not in fact be true. "Realistic about means as well
as ends, economics does not depend on the idea that human beings are effortless and infallible calculators."' 3 4 For instance, Pos-

ner points out that "[a] market may behave rationally, and hence
the economic model of human behavior would apply to it, even if
most of the individual buyers (or buys) are irrational." 3 5 Thus,

work "even when the [rational actor] aseconomic models can
6
" 13
sumption is false.

The fictional status of the rational actor assumption indicates
that it is a theoretical abstraction. But according to Posner, this
abstraction is saved from the label of formalism because the models it produces are empirically verifiable. As we have seen, one of
the defining characteristics of a formalistic legal theory is its ability
to "spare [ ] the lawyer or judge from a messy encounter with em131 Id. at 17.
132 Id. at 19.
133
134
'35
136

PosNER, supra note 22, at 40.
PosNEi, supra note 1, at 16.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
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pirical reality."1" 7 In contrast, traditional concepts such as private
property and free contract are formalistic because they function as
categories within an a priori universe of legal reasoning utterly divorced from the realities of social intercourse.
Although Posner applauds critical legal studies scholars such
as Morton Horowitz for demonstrating the ideological underpinnings of the traditionalist's theoretical abstractions-for showing
how they become reified, taken as necessary reflections of nature,
rather than contingent human constructions-he accuses critics of
falling into the same trap. "[I]n the flush of youth, realists and
especially the crits had really just exchanged one set of reified abstractions-Property and Contract-for another and equally unexamined set-Equality, Liberation, Socialism, and Democracy." 3 '
Indeed, this criticism (that contemporary legal theorists have
adopted the formalistic habit of simply positing some new abstract
legal concept to address a perceived social ill without any connection to the world of fact) is pervasive in Overcoming Law.
Strauss and Amar and Widawsky are examples we have visited,
but the book1 3is9 filled with chapters where Posner illustrates the
"recklessness"
with which these abstractions are advocated.
Catherine MacKinnon, he claims, is so "obsessed" with pornography that she reifies an abstract concept of gender equality in order
to justify regulation of pornographic expression that would otherwise violate the First Amendment. 4 Drucilla Cornell reifies
Hegellian concepts such as "reciprocal symmetry" and the "personhood" aspects of property to justify the elimination of the common law doctrine of employment at will."' Martha Minow reifies
the artificiality, the constructedness, of human relations and structures of perception in order to argue against the "ascription of
legal rights and duties" on the basis of categories (i.e. normal/disabled) that impose badges of inferiority on certain groups.1 42 Patricia Williams reifies both blackness 4 and whiteness"' in her
attempts to challenge the typical legal constructions of race, and
Robert Bork reifies original intent in the process of arguing that it
137

POSNER, supra note 22, at 41.

138 POSNER, supra note 1, at 281.
139 Id. at 362.
140 Id. at 359.
141 Id. at 302-5.
142 Id. at 287-89.
143 Id. at 373, 374-75.
144 Id. at 380.
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is the only responsible mode of constitutional interpretation. 145
Posner plays the role of demystifier, exposing the ideological underpinnings of each theory, warning against the temptation to believe its concepts are either natural or necessary. Wielding
economic empiricism as method, he demonstrates the "real" consequences, especially the costs, such proposals would entail.
A clarification is in order, however. The lay definition of reification is simply to treat something which is in fact contingent and
socially constructed as though it were natural, inevitable, necessary.
It means to "thingify." A more complex, politically charged definition is offered by Robert Gordon:
This process of allowing the structures we ourselves have built to
mediate relations among us so as to make us see ourselves as
performing abstract roles in a play that is produced by no
human agency is what is usually called (following Marx and such
modem writers as Sartre and Luklcs) reification. It is a way people have of manufacturing necessity: they build structures, then
act as if (and genuinely come to believe that) the structures they
have built are determined by history, human nature, economic
law. 146

Under either definition it is difficult to see how any of the theorists
listed above except Bork, and perhaps Posner himself, is guilty of
purveying reified abstractions. One of the essential elements of reification is that there already be an existing structure of social action which then gets treated as though it were natural or inevitable.
That is, the process of reification requires some cognizable social
practice to reify. (The classic example is capitalism and its attendant ideologies.) All the theorists except Bork are in fact arguing
againstalready reified social practices and for social practices which
do not yet exist. Perhaps the only unifying tenet of these theorists
is that the existing constructions of humanity (race, gender, physical ability, and labor) are neither natural nor inevitable, and therefore hold no special claim to the legal relations they produce,
protect, and preclude. Thus the notion that they are guilty of dealing in reified abstractions is at least somewhat ironic. Indeed it
would be a supremely ironic victory for law and economics if the
rational actor assumption-one of the very first concepts to which
the label "reified abstraction" was attached-was deemed a useful
premise for legal reasoning while most other concepts of human
behavior were relegated to the trash bin of reification.
145 Id. at 240.
146 Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theoy in THE PoLrMcs
PROGRESSIVE CRMQUE 420 (D. Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
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Now Posner's point may be more complex. He may be saying
that, unwittingly, theorists who attack today's reified abstractions
are merely "thingifying" their own ideals for tomorrow in the process. By treating their concepts as natural or inevitable ways of perceiving the world such theorists commit a formalistic error akin to
that which they so often criticize in traditional legal theory. "Even
a Horowitz," Posner remarks:
cannot escape the lure of formalism. The inseparability of public and private is... as much a dogma for him as their separability is a dogma of classical liberals. He seems unable, moreover,
to visualize an alternative to legal formalism, and this failure of
imagination leads him into a formalist trap. All law for Horowitz
is divided into formalism and politics, with 14the
latter viewed as
7
an arena of power, of inarticulate struggle.
If this is Posner's point about reification, though, it is difficult
to see how it contributes to a meaningful critique of radical theorists. Many radical theorists have raised the issue that we lack a
language either forjustification or transformation of the status quo
that can work apart from reification in Posner's sense of the term.
Theorization and persuasion may simply require that we abstract
and "thingify." In this case the interesting question is not whether
reification exists, but rather what is being reified and whether it is
done self-consciously or not. Patricia Williams, for instance, relates
stories of white racism and black innocence quite self-consciously.
This may reify whiteness as evil and blackness as good, but it does
so for the explicit purpose of combating the hegemonic reifications of race that legitimate racial oppression. Martha Minow may
reify the contingency of social meaning when she insists that the
disabled are just different, but she does so to combat the reification
of biology which undergirds societal assumptions about the inferiority of the disabled. In this sense, the debate about whether a
theory relies on reified abstractions for hegemonic or counter-hegemonic purposes resembles the tired debate about whether one
can distinguish invidious from remedial racial discrimination.
Those on the right tend to think one can't or shouldn't, and those
on the left tend to think one can and must.
Speculative consequentialism and the rhetoric of cost. "A pragmatist," Posner reminds us, "is interested in the consequences of reform proposals, and one consequence is cost." 14 8 The most basic
147 PosNER, supra note 1, at 284. For his more general critique of dogmatism in
leftist pragmatic theory see id. at 393.
148 Id. at 290.
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formalistic threat of economic analysis as legal theory, however, is
the reduction of general social consequences to narrow economic
costs. One of the most frequent criticisms in Overcoming Law is that
contemporary legal theorists promote reforms without analysis of
what these changes will cost. Minow wants the disabled to be
treated as if they were normal; Strauss wants social workers held
liable for failing to prevent child abuse, Radin wants tenants to be
able to renew their leases indefinitely; and Cornell wants workers
to be fired only upon a showing of just cause. None of them, however, offer any detailed consideration of the economic viability of
their proposals, and, as Posner argues, economic analysis reveals
that their proposals may have effects opposite from those desired.
The disabled may be resented for sucking inordinate resources
from general education, social workers may be paralyzed because
they will be liable for both action and inaction, rental housing may
disappear as tenants continuously renew their leases, and unemployment may rise while wages fall as job security is mandated.
Posner's point is well taken. Legal theorists often talk as if the
cost of a given course of action is not relevant to its normative validity. The danger, however, is that economic analysis will become
yet another formalistic method of speculating about hypothetical
bad consequences much like Wechsler's neutral principles and
Landgell's logic. The danger is particularly acute prior to empirical verification, and, unfortunately, most judicial decisions in hard
cases take place in this situation. The temptation to rely on economic cost as a measure of social consequences can thus become
just another form of abstract legal reasoning, divorced from the
complexity of reality, which allows judges to avoid a true confrontation with conflicting social desires. Posner himself concedes that
"most economic analysis is partial, and therefore incomplete, seeking to explain a part of the social world rather than the whole of
it."149

A related problem hinted at above is reductionism. The economist may be tempted to focus only on cost by asking about efficiency and wealth maximization because they are more readily
measured than moral, emotional, or political consequences. Indeed, Posner has repeatedly suggested that this is the proper role
of judges in hard cases, focusing on an ostensibly neutral and objective goal such as maximizing wealth and/or efficiency while leaving difficult, indeterminate, distributive questions to legislatures. 15 0
149 Id.

at 344.

150 In The Problems ofJurisprudencePosner writes:
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But suppressing non-economic consequences in this fashion has
two formalist consequences.
First, this separation of decision-making power mirrors the
Legal Process school's emphasis on decisional jurisdiction as a
means of ensuring judicial restraint. "Here," as Mark Kelman has
written, "the legal economists reengage the typical mainstream
Legal Process academics concerned above all with the allocation of
decision-making authority." 151 As we have seen, Posner ridicules
"process jurisprudence" for its formalism. Ironically, he is especially critical of its willingness to leave so much in the hands of
legislators. "[T]he legal process generation," he claims, "substituted an unreflective, indeed naive, faith in the probity and wisdom of legislators and administrators. Legal fiction flourished as
before, but bromides about federalism and institutional competence replaced ones about freedom of contract." 5 ' Why the delegation of distributive concerns to legislature is any less a formalistic
dodge than the legal process generation's desire to delegate socalled political questions to the same branch goes unanswered in
Overcoming Law.

Second, the focus on efficiency and wealth maximization is inherently formalistic. Both principles rely on a highly abstract and
politically charged definition of what people value. If one only
measures preferences as they are revealed in the marketplace, a
tainted picture of social desires and costs emerges-one that corresponds to the dictates of formal economic theory, but not to empirical reality. Again, as Mark Kelman illustrates, "the fact that people
may be unable either to pay much to make a certain use (or even
to resist large bribes to waive the right to insist on that use unless
compensated) does not really mean that they don't value the use
highly; the legal economist's focus on wealth-dependent valuation
of resources is simply biased, without consequentialist explanation,
Legislatures... have by virtue of their taxing and spending powers powerful tools for the redistribution of wealth. So an efficient division of
labor between the legislative and judicial branches has the legislative
branch concentrate on catering to interest-group demands for wealth
distribution and the judicial branch on meeting the broad-based social
demand for efficient rules governing safety, property, and transactions.
POSNER, supra note 22, at 360. Particularly prominent in other writings by Posner is
the combination of this proposition with the assertion that wealth maximization has
been the hidden logic of the common law. See id at 359; RIcHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALsts or LAw 22-23, 251-264 (4th ed. 1992).
151 Mark Kelman, A Critique of ConservativeLegal Thought in THE PoLIICS OF LAw: A
PROGRESSrVE CRmIQouE 442 (D. Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
152 PosNER supra note 1, at 76 (citation omitted).
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toward those with market power." 153 In this sense, economic analysis provides only a partial, income-biased empirical method. Other
means of valuation are formalistically dropped from the picture,
and judges are thereby authorized to make decisions about conflicting social desires with market blinders on, no different in effect
than the laissez-faire blinders of the Lochner era.
A good example of the formalism Posner's blend of empiricism and economic analysis produces is his willingness to reject (on
the grounds that it is "inefficient and regressive"1 5 4 ) Cornell's suggestion that we eliminate employment at will. On the efficiency
claim, Posner runs a clean, relatively sophisticated economic analysis which allows him to conclude that granting workers tenure
would not be "an efficient method of fostering [cooperative relations between labor and management] .151 "If it were," Posner
quips, "why would not companies adopt it without prodding by
government?" 15 6 This is precisely the kind of blindness typically
induced by wealth-dependent valuation. Having zeroed in on efficiency as the main consideration in evaluating a change in the
structure of employment, the market is assumed to already indicate
what is justified by efficiency. The result is a profoundly conservative analysis which, by shifting all "distributive" concerns off the
judge's palate, ignores the arbitrariness of the initial set of entitlements in which the market functions along with a whole host of
other social consequences relevant to the evaluation of employ157
ment at will.
Posner attempts to dismiss some of these consequences by arguing that eliminating employment at will would be regressive, a
reversion from contract to status. Here he employs the traditional
lawyer's techniques of legal reasoning that he derided in Chapter
One to speculate further on the bad consequences job tenure
would produce and to avoid a head on confrontation with the full
normative import of Cornell's suggestion. Although job tenure
might enhance an individual's sense of personhood, Posner argues, tenure might also be a denial of personhood-"forc [ing an
employee] to forgo his preferred job-tenure package and accept a
153 Kelman, supranote 151, at 443. See also MARGARETJANE RADIN, CONTESTED COM-

MODrrlTES (1996) (discussing problems of value-commensurability and reductionism
as problems of commodification in the rhetoric and practice of economic analysis).
154 POSNER, supra note 1, at 300.
155 Id. at 309.
156 Id. at 309.
157

Kelman, supra note 151, at 443.

1996]

1849

TOTEMISM TRANSCENDED

lower wage in exchange for greater job security. .

. ."'

He goes

on to reduce the concept of personhood and its relation to propdislikes losing what he had
erty to a claim "merely that everyone
159
grown accustomed to having."

Posner then queries rhetorically whether those who already
have some form of tenure in the workforce have more personhood
than those who currently do not. "Does the union worker have
more personhood that the nonunion worker? Does the civil servant have a greater sense of personality than his counterpart who
works without tenure in a private sectorjob?" 16 ° Having drawn the
positive consequences ofjob tenure into question, Posner thenjuxtaposes these against the certainty of its negative consequences.
"[I] t is far from clear," he remarks, "that Cornell's proposal would
if adopted cause these notions [personhood and reciprocal symmetry] to be more fully actualized than they already are. What it
clearly would do is curtail freedom of contract, an important part
of Hegel's notion of freedom." '6 1
Posner's negative speculative stance in the analysis of personhood generates some dubious, unempirical generalizations.
For instance, losing one's job is assumed to be a "known risk"
which apparently "anyone who desires and is willing to pay for" can
negotiate themselves out of, either by contract or by entering part
of the work force which offers job protection.' 6 2 On being fired
under the common law regime of employment at will, Posner dismissively minimizes the harmful effects, once again dodging any
real confrontation with the concept of personhood and its relation
to an individual's experience of work or lack thereof. "Given unemployment and welfare, [the consequences of being fired] do not
even include becoming a poor person, in the sense of someone
utterly destitute without property .... 63 Even if the effect is to

become poor in Posner's thin sense of the term, he claims startlingly that "[p] oor people in the United States have enough goods
to retain a lively sense of themselves as persons. It is patronizing,"
he ventures with confidence, "to suggest otherwise."164
Finally, Posner hammers home the point that job tenure
would be regressive by implying a term into Cornell's argument
158 POSNER, supra note
159 Id. at 303.
160 Id. at 305-6.
161 Id. at 306.
162 Id. at 305.
163 Id. at 303.
164 Id. at 303.

1, at 304.
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and analogizing job tenure to a practice laden with highly charged,
negative moral and emotional sentiment. First, job tenure is assumed by Posner to logically imply a right on the part of the employer "to demand a reason of the employee for quitting."165 From
there he suggests thatjob tenure is troublingly analogous to slavery
since "the employee who could not show just cause for leaving his
employment might be forced to spend his whole life in a job he
hated."" In sum, job tenure would take us long strides back on
the path, reified here as logical and progressive; that liberal societies have traveled to freedom. "Employment at will," Posner writes,
"happens to be the logical terminus on the road that begins with
slavery and makes intermediate stops at serfdom, indentured servitude, involuntary servitude, and guild restrictions. "167
The formal resemblance to Wechsler's rhetorically embellished "speculation on the deleterious effects of segregation" is
striking. Although economic concepts are interspersed with, if not
wholly substituted for, purely legal concepts, the theorizing remains abstract and unempirical. Posner manifests the same dependence on logic, rhetorical persuasion, and hypothesis, and, just as
he says of Wechsler, "the only consequences he is interested in are
speculative bad consequences of the position that he questions." 1"
Thus even if all that Posner argues against eliminating employment
at will turned out to be true (and this is far from clear), he has not
escaped the lure of formalism in the process. For an exclusive focus on the relations between legal concepts Posner substitutes economic conceptualism; for homogeneity of outlook and of values as
the motor of consensus he substitutes a pragmatic philosophy
which indeterminately relies on and questions consensus; for indifference to the empirical world he substitutes an almost obsessive, if
incomplete and potentially biased, economic empiricism; and for
antipathy to legal novelty born of prudish commitment to precedent he substitutes antipathy to legal novelty born of excessive
commitment to the principles of neoclassical economics.1 69 The
predictive accuracy of his method would therefore be no answer to
the question whether it is the way legal theorists should reason,
whether it is a true middle path between traditionalism and
radicalism.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 306.
167 Id. at 301.
168 Id. at 73.
169 See supra notes 30-32.
165

166
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CONCLUSION

The old totem is dead. Law is not science, an art of deduction
or a priori reasoning; nor is law independent of the political, social, and economic forces which shape our cultures, our intuitions,
and our conceptions ofjustice. About this there is now almost universal consensus. Joining the ranks of contemporary dissenters (a
group he calls "Skeptics"' 70 ), Posner participates in reenacting and
celebrating the demise of the old totem. The Problems ofJurisprudence, Posner's 1990 farewell message to the epistemology and metaphysics of traditionalism, is a great achievement in this regard.1 7 1
In OvercomingLaw, however, we find Posner magnifying and implementing his pragmatic, social scientific legal theory (first suggested
in The Problems of Jurisprudence) with considerable ambivalence.
This ambivalence, I have tried to show, is born of a need to save
economic analysis from being deemed just another post-totemic
ideology-a need itself born of the rather nostalgic, if not thoroughly totemic, desire to save law and legal theory from anarchy,
from a full fledged descent into competing idealisms and ideologies. Posner makes credible anti-foundationalist, anti-formalist gestures toward the camp of Skeptics and even places economic
analysis on the Skeptics' epistemological premises, but he then
slips into the same traditionalist habits that he so acutely criticizes
in an attempt to avoid the utopianism and nihilism which Skeptical
172
theories supposedly embody.
On the one hand, it is tempting to conclude that there simply
is no middle road-no denial of formalism that does not require
an acceptance that law is politics all the way down, and no acceptance that law is politics without denying that the dream of a viable
formalism can ever be realized apart from the very totemization
which legal theory has so recently escaped. On the other hand, it
is tempting to embrace the notion that a pragmatically-based economic social science (or some other hybrid methodology) can traverse the path to justice without succumbing to the pitfalls of either
formalism or radicalism. These are the temptations which polarize
the field of legal theory today. The old totem is dead and each
PosNE, supra note 22, at 32-33.
171 See Sanford Levinson, Strolling Down the Path of the Law (and Toward CriticalLegal
Studies?): The Jurisprudenceof Richard Posner, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1221 (1991) (book
review).
172 On the problem of utopianism see POSNER, supra note 1,at 295. On nihilism in
the descendants of legal realism see id. at 20.
170
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legal theorist faces a choice between them in venturing onto the
field.
In favor of the first temptation it is worth noting with Max
Weber that "[a]n anarchist can surely be a good legal scholar"this because:
[Tihe Archimedean point of his convictions, which is outside
the conventions and presuppositions which are so self-evident to
us, can equip him to perceive problems in the fundamental postulates of legal theory which escape those who take
them for
17
granted. Fundamentaldoubt is the father of knowledge.

1

Weber's point is that realpolitik-"the art of the possible"'174 is
not the only, certainly not the best, form of socio-legal analysis.
"The possible," he reminds us, "is often reached only by striving for
the impossible that lies beyond it." 1 75 Robert Gordon makes a similar point in reply to the charge that critical theory is idealism. The
charge is true, he writes, "in that the belief it criticizes is indeed
that among the main constraints upon making social life more
bearable are these terrible, constricting limits on imagination
....,"76 Overcoming these constraints, "getting to the point of
seeing that change is possible, is a necessary first step. People do
not revolt because their situation is bad; they can suffer in silence
for centuries. They revolt when their situation comes to seem unjust and alterable." 177 Radicalism in legal scholarship, then, however
disturbing or unconventional its voice, may have as much to contribute to the life of the law as any more "practical," more "predictive," or more "empirical" method such as economic analysis. One
might, in fact prefer some version of radical skepticism precisely
because of the totemic temptations latent in any attempt to establish a middle position.
In favor of the second temptation we have all the dangers, all
the weaknesses of radical skepticism so assiduously detailed in Overcoming Law--a book perhaps best described as a plea for the art of
the possible in legal theory. Unfortunately, as between the two
(radicalism and realpolitik) there is no neutral, empirical, or even
ethical means of choosing. 178 Here, then, it is perhaps most true
173 MAX WEBER, The Meaning of "EthicalNeutrality" in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE
SOCL SCIENCES 7 (Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch ed., trans. 1949) (emphasis
added).
174 Id. at 23-24.

175

Id.

176 Gordon, supra note 146, at 422.
177 Id. (emphasis original).
178 As Weber puts it:
[E]ven in the sphere of personal conduct there are quite specific ethical
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that one ends up falling back (hopefully with caution, if not with
deep skepticism) on intuition, experience, and, alas, common
sense.

problems which ethics cannot settle on the basis of its own presuppositions. Those include above all, the basic questions: (a) whether the
intrinsic value of ethical conduct - the "pure will" or the "conscience"
as it used to be called - is sufficient for its justification .. .or (b)
whether the responsibility for the predictable consequences of the action is to be taken into consideration. All radical revolutionary political
attitudes... have their point of departure in the first postulate; all Realpolitik in the latter. Both invoke ethical maxims. But these maxims are
in eternal conflict - a conflict which cannot be resolved by means of
ethics alone.
WEBER, supra note 173, at 16.

